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I’LL SEE YOU IN COURT, BUT NOT PURSUANT TO DASA 
Adam I. Kleinberg & Alex Eleftherakis*  
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2018, both New York State and New York City strengthened 
their laws designed to prevent incidents of workplace sexual 
harassment.1  #MeToo has been a constant source of media coverage 
and public discussion.  
But the goal of ending all types of harassment is not a new one.  
It has been a legislative focus for years, especially in public schools.  
In the wake of the shooting at Columbine high school in 1999, states 
across the country began passing anti-bullying laws to address and 
prevent incidents of violence and harassment in our schools’ halls.2  
For its part, New York passed the Dignity for All Students Act 
(hereinafter “DASA”) in 2010.3  The goal of DASA is to provide 
students with an educational environment free of discrimination, 
harassment, and bullying through the implementation of proactive and 
preventative policies and procedures.  But what is the remedy for a 
student who claims his or her school has failed to live up to its 
obligations under DASA?  Does the statute provide a mechanism to 
recover monetary damages in a civil lawsuit?  
While the New York State and City statutes referenced above 
permit a private right of action and an award of monetary damages, 
whether DASA permitted these has been an open question in the 
Appellate Division, Second Department since the statute’s enactment.  
 
* Attorneys at Law, Sokoloff Stern LLP. 
1 See Kristin Klein Wheaton, New Legislation on Sexual Harassment, N.Y. ST. BAR ASSOC., 
http://www.nysba.org/Section/Municipal_Lawyer/New_Legislation_on_Sexual_Harassment
_Will_Significantly_Affect_the_Handling_of_These_Cases_for_Municipalities/ (last visited 
Jan. 31, 2019). 
2 Dimitrios Nikolaou, Do Anti-Bullying Policies Deter In-School Bullying Victimization?, 
50 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 1, 1-2 (2017). 
3 2010 N.Y. Laws 482 (codified at N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 10-18). 
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Until recently, that is.  The Appellate Division has now answered the 
question.  
II. WHAT IS DASA? 
On September 13, 2010, New York State Governor David 
Paterson signed New York State’s DASA into law.4  The statute took 
effect on July 1, 2012 with amendments effective on July 1, 2013.5  
DASA amended New York Education Law by creating a new 
section (Article 2—Dignity for All Students)6 and amending Section 
801-a of New York Education Law.7  According to the New York State 
Education Department, DASA requires  
instruction in civility, citizenship, and character 
education by expanding the concepts of tolerance, 
respect for others and dignity to include:  an awareness 
and sensitivity in the relations of people, including but 
not limited to, different races, weights, national origins, 
ethnic groups, religions, religious practices, mental or 
physical abilities, sexual orientations, gender identity, 
and sexes.8  
The statute further amended Section 2801 of the Education 
Law by requiring the boards of education of public school districts to 
include DASA requirements in their codes of conduct.  School districts 
must also collect and report data regarding “material incidents of 
discrimination, harassment, and bullying.”9  All of this is to “provide 
the State’s public elementary and secondary school students with a safe 
and supportive environment free from discrimination, intimidation, 
taunting, harassment, and bullying on school property, a school bus 
and/or at a school function.”10 
These goals seem beyond cavil.  Who would argue that 
children should be subjected to hostile learning environments or that 
school districts need not discourage and prohibit them?  
 
4 The Dignity Act, N.Y. ST. EDUC. DEP’T, http://www.p12.nysed.gov/dignityact/ (last 
updated July 9, 2018). 
5 Id.  
6 N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 10-18 (McKinney 2018). 
7 Id. § 801-a. 
8 The Dignity Act, supra note 4. 
9 Id.  
10 Id.  
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A question arises when there is an allegation a school district 
has not met its DASA requirements.  In that situation, who is the arbiter 
of such a claim and what remedies may be awarded?  
III. THE ESKENAZI CASE 
J.E.M. was a high school student enrolled at Connetquot High 
School, part of the Connetquot Central School District (hereinafter 
“Connetquot”).11  He also received additional special education 
instruction from Eastern Suffolk BOCES (hereinafter “ESB”) at a 
separate location.12  
During the 2012-13 school year, J.E.M. rode the morning 
school bus to Connetquot, took a bus from Connetquot to ESB for an 
afternoon program, and rode the school bus home from ESB at the end 
of the day.13  J.E.M. alleged another special education student harassed 
him throughout the school year.14  
J.E.M. first sued Connetquot and ESB in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of New York, alleging violations 
of federal and state law for failing to prevent another student from 
allegedly harassing him.15  After the Eastern District dismissed all 
federal causes of action and declined to assert jurisdiction over the state 
law claims, J.E.M. re-filed the state law claims in the Suffolk County 
Supreme Court.16  One of the state law claims was for an alleged 
violation of DASA.17 
A. The Trial Court Decision 
Defendants filed a pre-answer motion to dismiss portions of the 
complaint, including those seeking recovery under DASA.18  The trial 
court denied the motion to dismiss the DASA claim.19  
 
11 Eskenazi-McGibney v. Connetquot Cent. Sch. Dist., 89 N.Y.S.3d 295, 296 (App. Div., 
2d Dep’t 2018).  
12 Id.  
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Eskenazi-McGibney v. Connetquot Cent. Sch. Dist., 84 F. Supp. 3d 221 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). 
16 Eskenazi-McGibney, 89 N.Y.S.3d at 295. 
17 Id. 
18 Eskenazi-McGibney v. Connetquot Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 15-11449, slip op. at 2 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Apr. 18, 2016). 
19 Id. at 5. 
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The trial court found that the text of DASA does not include 
any express private cause of action for an aggrieved student.20  
Specifically, the trial court found “[DASA] does not provide any 
enforcement mechanisms, and it is silent with respect to remedies for 
a violation.”21  
Accordingly, a plaintiff may only assert a DASA claim if the 
principles of statutory construction allow for an implied right of action 
for a violation of the statute.  Here, the trial court reasoned DASA 
allows an implied right of action under “the long-standing rule of 
statutory construction . . . that a private right of action for the violation 
of a statute exists for the benefit of persons injured by that violation.”22  
In determining whether DASA provides a private right of 
action, the trial court found an implied claim promotes the legislative 
purpose of the statute because it “would provide an incentive to enforce 
the anti-bullying policy and create a deterrent for those officials who 
would ignore the complaints of those students who the statute seeks to 
protect,” and followed DASA’s legislative scheme because DASA 
“and its implementing regulations are not simply remedial in nature 
but afford the students various rights and impose an affirmative duty 
on school officials to provide the students with an environment that is 
free from discrimination, bullying and harassment.”23  
Neither the New York State Court of Appeals nor the Second 
Department had decided this issue whether DASA affords an implied 
private cause of action.  However, in an unpublished 2014 short form 
order, a Nassau County Supreme Court trial court dismissed all of a 
student-plaintiff’s causes of action against a public school district 
except for a claim under DASA.24  
B. Decisions in Other Courts 
While the Second Department had not yet addressed this issue, 
the Third Department had in 2016.  In Motta ex rel. Motta v. Eldred 
Central School District,25 the Third Department became the first of the 
Appellate Division Departments to decide the issue and held: 
 
20 Id.; see also N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 10-18 (McKinney 2018). 
21 Eskenazi-McGibney, No. 15-11449, slip op. at 3. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 4. 
24 Simon v. Bellmore-Merrick Cent. High Sch. Dist., No. 0139012013, 2014 WL 11189280 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 14, 2014). 
25 36 N.Y.S.3d 239 (App. Div., 3d Dep’t 2016).  
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There is no explicit private right of action in the 
statutory scheme nor can one be implied from the 
statutory language and the legislative history (see 
Education Law § 10 et seq.). DASA is intended to 
create and implement school board policies in order to 
“afford all students in public schools an environment 
free of discrimination and harassment” caused by 
incidents of “bullying, taunting or intimidation” 
(Education Law § 10) “through the appropriate training 
of personnel, mandatory instruction for students on 
civility and tolerance, and reporting requirements” (see 
Education Law § 13). To imply a private right of action 
would not further the legislative purpose or comport 
with the statutory scheme.26 
Both before, and after Motta, two federal district courts, relying 
on principles of statutory interpretation to DASA’s text and legislative 
history, also held the statute does not afford an implied private cause 
of action.27  Besides these cases, there were not any reported decisions 
on whether DASA provided an implied cause of action.  
C. The Appeal 
Defendants appealed the trial court’s decision in Eskenazi.  
There was no dispute DASA contains no private cause of action under 
which J.E.M. or any other litigant may sue.  Defendants disputed the 
finding of an implied claim in the statute, arguing the legislative 
history explicitly indicates the statute is not meant to serve as means 
for a private right of action.   
“A statutory command . . . does not necessarily carry with it a 
right of private enforcement by means of tort litigation.”28  “When a 
statute is silent . . . courts have had to determine whether a private right 
of action may be fairly implied.”29 
 
26 Id. at 239 (emphasis added) (internal case citations omitted). 
27 See C.T. v. Valley Stream Union Free Sch. Dist., 201 F. Supp. 3d 307, 327 (E.D.N.Y. 
2016) (referencing Motta and holding “there is no private right of action under DASA”); 
Terrill v. Windham-Ashland-Jewett Cent. Sch. Dist., 176 F. Supp. 3d 101, 109 (N.D.N.Y. 
2016) (noting the court found no “reported decisions permitting a private right of action . . . 
under DASA,” reviewed the legislative history, and held DASA does not permit an implied 
right of action). 
28 Uhr v. E. Greenbush Cent. Sch. Dist., 720 N.E.2d 886, 888 (N.Y. 1999).  
29 Id.  
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The Court of Appeals has developed a three-factor test to 
determine whether such an implied right of action exists, which 
considers: 
(1) whether the plaintiff is one of the class for whose 
particular benefit the statute was enacted; 
(2) whether recognition of a private right of action 
would promote the legislative purpose; and 
(3) whether creation of such a right would be consistent 
with the legislative scheme.30 
Applying these factors, the Court of Appeals has “established 
that the most critical inquiry in determining whether to recognize a 
private cause of action where one is not expressly provided is whether 
such action would be consistent with the over-all legislative scheme.”31 
Here, DASA is intended to “afford all students in public 
schools an environment free of discrimination and harassment.”32  As 
a public school student alleging in-school harassment, J.E.M. likely 
falls within “the class for whose particular benefit the statute was 
enacted.”33  But the important factors regarding legislative purpose and 
scheme precluded an implied cause of action.  
1. A Private Cause of Action Would Contradict 
DASA’s Legislative Purpose and Scheme 
The plain text and legislative history of DASA demonstrate 
that an implied private right of action contradicts the statute’s 
legislative purpose and scheme. 
DASA’s plain text is focused on prevention and enforcement.  
“A private right of action for a new type of claim should not be 
judicially recognized by implication ‘where the statutes in question 
already contain[] substantial enforcement mechanisms, indicating that 
 
30 Id. (citing Sheehy v. Big Flats Cmty. Day, Inc., 541 N.E.2d 18 (N.Y. 1989)); see also In 
re Stray from Heart, Inc. v. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene of City of N.Y., 982 N.E.2d 
594, 595 (N.Y. 2012).  
31 Brian Hoxie’s Painting Co. v. Cato-Meridian Cent. Sch. Dist., 556 N.E.2d 1087, 1089 
(N.Y. 1990) (collecting cases). 
32 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 10 (McKinney 2018).  
33 Eskenazi-McGibney v. Connetquot Cent. Sch. Dist., 89 N.Y.S.3d 295, 297 (App. Div., 
2d Dep’t 2018). 
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the Legislature considered how best to effectuate its intent and 
provided the avenues for relief it deemed warranted.’”34  
DASA’s language contains no indication the Legislature 
intended the statute to serve any private remedial function.  Rather, 
DASA requires schools to impose policies and guidelines to prevent 
bullying,35 mandates State Education Department reporting and other 
responsibilities regarding the law’s implementation,36 and establishes 
protections for individuals reporting harassment.37  This focus on 
preventive functions and State regulation shows a private right of 
action contradicts DASA’s preventive legislative scheme.38 
Also, Education Law § 17 specifically provides that nothing in 
DASA will “[p]reclude or limit any right or cause of action under any 
local, state or federal ordinance, law or regulation including but not 
limited to any rights or remedies available under” the IDEA, Title VII, 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA.39  Had the 
legislature intended any private right of action, it could have 
specifically included such a right in Education Law § 17, or elsewhere, 
in the legislation.  This also indicates no implied action is available.40 
And if DASA’s text was not telling enough, the statute’s 
legislative history explicitly indicates, often, that the Legislature did 
not intend for the statute to be used as a private right of action.  One 
federal court, describing the contents of DASA’s legislative “bill 
jacket,” noted: 
 
34 Flagstar Bank, FSB v. State, 978 N.Y.S.2d 266, 273 (App. Div., 2d Dep’t 2013) 
(alteration in original) (citing Cruz v. TD Bank, N.A., 2 N.E.3d 221, 227 (N.Y. 2013)). 
35 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 13. 
36 Id. §§ 13-24. 
37 Id. § 16.  
38 See Mark G. v. Sabol, 717 N.E.2d 1067, 1071 (N.Y. 1999) (explaining that the preventive 
services provisions of Child Welfare Reform Act, which provided for comprehensive 
enforcement mechanisms centered on local social services districts, did not create implied 
private right of action). 
39 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 17. 
40 See Flagstar Bank, FSB v. State, 978 N.Y.S.2d 266, 273 (App. Div., 2d Dep’t 2013) 
(“[T]he Legislature clearly knew how to include a private right of action when it intended to 
do so, and the omission of any similar language . . . evinces a legislative intent not to provide 
for a private right of action.”); Davis v. State, 937 N.Y.S.2d 521, 523 (App. Div., 4th Dep’t 
2012) (citing Mark G., 717 N.E.2d at 1071) (“It is beyond cavil that the Legislature knew how 
to include a private right of action in the former statute if it intended to do so and, 
‘[c]onsidering that the statute gives no hint of any private enforcement remedy for money 
damages,’ we will not infer that the Legislature in fact intended to do so.” (alteration in 
original)).   
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[I]n a letter from Assemblyman Daniel O’Donnell, who 
sponsored DASA in the New York State Assembly, to 
Governor David Patterson, Mr. O’Donnell stated that 
“the Legislature intends [DASA] to be primarily a 
preventive, rather than punitive, measure; it should 
therefore be implemented accordingly, with the 
emphasis on proactive techniques such as training and 
early intervention to prevent discrimination and 
harassment.” N.Y. Bill Jacket, 2010 A.B. 3661, Ch. 482 
(Letter dated Sept. 7, 2010, from N.Y.S. Assemblyman 
Daniel O’Donnell, 69th Assembly District, to N.Y. 
Gov. Patterson [sic]) (emphasis added). Similarly, 
Senator Thomas Duane wrote to Governor Patterson 
[sic] that “DASA focuses on education and prevention 
of harassment and discrimination before it begins rather 
than punishment after the fact.” N.Y. Bill Jacket, 2010 
A.B. 3661, Ch. 482 (Letter dated July 16, 2010, from 
N.Y. Senator Thomas Duane, 29th District, to N.Y. 
Gov. Patterson [sic]) (emphasis in original).41 
And during the Assembly floor debate of DASA, one legislator 
asked “[w]hat is the remedy, if you will, for a student who feels that 
they were harassed and the school has this policy in place, but doesn’t 
abide by the policy?”42  The Assembly sponsor of the bill responded: 
This bill does not address any remedy beyond internally 
to the school. The school has an obligation to have a 
policy. The school has an obligation to have people on 
staff who know how to deal with the policy. The school 
has an obligation to protect all children from that 
conduct. If, in fact, the school fails, then the school 
fails. This bill has nothing to do with the remedy outside 
the school failing. This bill requires the State Education 
Department to promulgate regulations to assist schools, 
if they need assisting, on how to make sure that schools 
 
41 Terrill v. Windham-Ashland-Jewett Cent. Sch. Dist., 176 F. Supp. 3d 101, 107-08 
(N.D.N.Y. 2016) (alteration in original). 
42 Id. at 108. 
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remain an environment that are free from harassment 
and discrimination.43 
The Legislature also drafted the bill “to be integrated with 
existing SED programs—such as the Safe Schools Against Violence 
Education Program (Project SAVE).”44  DASA extended some of the 
same training and reporting obligations previously imposed by Project 
SAVE.45  Education Law § 15 specifically provides that the 
Commissioner could establish a procedure for school district 
submission of annual reports of material incidents of harassment, 
bullying and discrimination through the “use of the existing uniform 
violent incident reporting system.”46  But the Project SAVE legislation 
also does not provide a private right of action. 
D. The Appellate Decision 
On December 12, 2018, the Second Department found in 
Defendants’ favor and ruled there is no implied private right of action 
under DASA for an alleged failure to enforce policies prohibiting 
discrimination and harassment.47 
In line with Court of Appeals jurisprudence, the Second 
Department focused on whether recognition of an implied right of 
action would be consistent with DASA’s legislative scheme.  In the 
court’s words, this inquiry  
is the most critical because “the Legislature has both the 
right and the authority to select the methods to be used 
in effectuating its goals, as well as to choose the goals 
themselves. Thus, regardless of its consistency with the 
basic legislative goal, a private right of action should 
not be judicially sanctioned if it is incompatible with 
the enforcement mechanism chosen by the Legislature 
or with some other aspect of the over-all statutory 
scheme.”48  
 
43 Id. at 108-09; Assemb. 3661, 223d Leg., Reg. Sess., at 17-18 (N.Y. 2010) (emphasis 
added). 
44 Assemb. 3661, at 9. 
45 See id. at 3. 
46 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 15 (McKinney 2018). 
47 See Eskenazi-McGibney v. Connetquot Cent. Sch. Dist., 89 N.Y.S.3d 295, 299 (App. 
Div., 2d Dep’t 2018). 
48 Id. at 297 (quoting Sheehy v. Big Flats Cmty. Day, Inc., 541 N.E.2d 18, 21 (N.Y. 1989)). 
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Turning to DASA, the court concluded that “[a] review of 
DASA’s legislative history shows that finding a private right of action 
under the act would be inconsistent with the legislative scheme.”49  For 
example, the court cited Senator Duane’s letter to the Governor in 
which he described DASA as focusing “on the education and 
prevention of harassment and discrimination before it begins rather 
than punishment after the fact.”50  The court also honed in on Senator 
Duane’s observation that under the existing regime, school districts 
were paying “a high cost in civil damages for failure to prevent 
bullying,” thereby suggesting that implementing DASA would 
alleviate such costs.51  Similarly, the court relied on the bill sponsor’s 
statement “the Legislature intends [DASA] to be primarily a 
preventive, rather than punitive, measure; it should therefore be 
implemented accordingly, with the emphasis on proactive techniques 
such as training and early intervention to prevent discrimination and 
harassment.”52  The court concluded, “[t]he legislative history plainly 
demonstrates that the Legislature did not intend to provide for civil 
damages for a violation of DASA, and that recognizing one would be 
inconsistent with the legislative scheme.”53  
IV. CONCLUSION 
So, should bullies be rejoicing about this legal development?  
Of course not.  Indeed, the Second Department made clear, “DASA 
does not prevent a student from bringing other statutory claims against 
a school district, and thus, holding that DASA does not provide a 
private right of action does not leave students without enforcement 
mechanisms and remedies.”54  Families can still commence claims of 
negligent supervision and possibly violations of federal statutes 
depending on the particulars.  
 
49 Id.  
50 Id. at 298 (quoting Senate Introducer’s Letter in Support, Bill Jacket, L. 2010 ch. 482 at 
7).  
51 Id.  
52 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Assembly Sponsor’s Letter in Support, Bill Jacket, L. 
2010 ch. 482 at 11).  
53 Id. 
54 Id. (citing Terrill v. Windham-Ashland-Jewett Cent. Sch. Dist., 176 F. Supp. 3d 101, 109 
(N.D.N.Y. 2016)). 
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Further, as addressed in the Second Department decision of SC 
v. Monroe-Woodbury Central School District,55 a parent may file a 
complaint with the New York State Commissioner of Education when 
seeking to challenge a school district’s policies.56  “Allegations that a 
public school failed to adopt and implement adequate policies and 
procedures to prevent bullying and harassment should be addressed, in 
the first instance, to the Commissioner of Education.”57 
This is because Education Law § 310 provides that an 
aggrieved party may appeal to the commissioner of education “any . . 
. official act or decision of any officer, school authorities, or meetings 
concerning any other matter under [the New York Education Law], or 
any other act pertaining to common schools.”58  This provision 
provides the commissioner with “broad discretion” to review a “wide 
range of actions.”59  
In conclusion, DASA has been an effective tool in reducing 
incidents of student harassment.  It just will not be an effective tool in 
generating litigation.60  
 
 
55 23 N.Y.S.3d 906 (App. Div., 2d Dep’t 2016), leave to appeal denied sub nom. SC v. 
Monroe Woodbury Cent. Sch. Dist., 56 N.E.3d 898 (N.Y. 2016). 
56 Id. at 906. 
57 Id. (citing N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 310; cf. Matter of N. Syracuse Cent. School Dist. v. N.Y. 
State Div. of Human Rights, 973 N.E.2d 162 (N.Y. 2012). 
58 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 310(7) (McKinney 2018).  
59 Woods v. Rondout Valley Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 466 F.3d 232, 248 (2d Cir. 
2006); see also Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist., 391 N.E.2d 1352 (N.Y. 1979) (in 
dismissing a claim of “educational malpractice,” citing, under New York Education Law § 
310(7), “the right of students presently enrolled in public schools, and their parents, to take 
advantage of the administrative processes provided by statute to enlist the aid of the 
Commissioner of Education in ensuring that such students receive a proper education”).  
60 The authors represented ESB in the referenced litigation.  
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